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1. Introduction  
This article compares the rent regulation in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Then it turns to rights that 
the tenants are given that normally rest with the owners, including the right to perpetual use, the right 
to transfer the apartment, the right to sublet the whole apartment or part of it. These elements of 
tenant “ownership rights” are compared and leads up to the question of whether they should be 
assessed as so important in relation to contractual principles that one can state that a tenant has a 
“right of ownership” to a home. Finally, rent regulation is revisited. If tenants can be viewed as 
having “ownership rights”, would that affect our attitudes towards rent regulation? 
 
2. Property right or contractual right  
Tenancy regulation can be perceived in at least two ways. When the contract expires or is terminated, 
the property is returned to its owner. According to contract law principles, the tenant is regarded as a 
renter of the dwelling and only acquires rights in relation to the opposite party in the contract – the 
property owner. 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on the three TENLAW national reports for Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as well as the 
comparative report on the three nations. All reports can be found on the website: www.tenlaw.uni-bremen.de. 
 An agreement on the renting of a dwelling can also be seen as a right to use a home perpetually. The 
right to use land, buildings, fences and other structures built on it has always been specially regulated 
and the legal term for this is real property. It follow different sets of legal principles, for example real 
property often gives the user rights in relation to everyone else (rights in rem). 
Before the industrial revolution, land was the most important property. The rights to farm it and pass it 
on to children were the central elements of ownership. There was no self-evident right to sell land to 
the highest bidder or to convert the use of land from farming to other uses. Giving the owner those 
rights – as elements in the new, liberal, concept of ownership – was an important part of the industrial  
revolution.
2
 
The farmer paid the landlord, for instance by maintaining the land, paying a share of the crop as rent, 
and doing work for the landlord. If the farmer fulfilled his duties, he could have a secure tenancy, 
which sometimes even included a right to pass it on to a spouse, or children. These rights created a 
perception of joint ownership between the farmer and the landlord; it was a mix between renting and 
owning and could be regarded as a real property right. In many EU countries, traces of the old Roman 
land-lease called emphyteusis are still in place, and renting a home is sometimes treated as a kind of 
real property right.
 3
  
Today, the whole of continental Europe applies the principle of ownership as (in principle) undivided. 
Tenants are not owners of their homes.
4
  Through national law in all of EU, the tenant has some 
“ownership rights” that cannot be derogated from which can include perpetual use.  
Tenancy law originated as contract law more than a century ago in all three Nordic Members of EU 
and the landlord had full ownership rights.
5
 This happened around 1900 when contract law was at its 
most liberal and freedom of contract applied in all three countries with regard to rented housing. 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden established their first regulation with tenancy protection during the 
First World War.
6
 Rent regulation was only one of many price regulation laws during the war, and 
tenancy protection – requiring the landlord to show just cause for terminating a contract – was 
necessary to render the price regulations effective. 
These rights have by and large remained and has been viewed as protection for the weaker party in the 
contract (just as in the case of consumers or employees), but they have not made us ask whether 
tenancy may be should be viewed as a real property right. 
 
3. Rent regulation  
Today Sweden and Denmark still have rent control in the private sector through legislation, but 
Finland does not.
7
 In Denmark, only the private sector is bound by the price regulation. Municipal 
housing companies do not strive to maximise profits and thus do not need to be under any price 
regulation. In Sweden, almost all rental apartments fall under the same rent regulation.  
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 3.1 The rent regulation regimes in Sweden and Denmark, and Finland 
The starting point for determining the rent in Sweden and Denmark (and Finland) is based on the 
contractual freedom that arises in connection with the establishment of tenancy agreements. However, 
the legislation contains a number of mandatory rules, which mean that the rent may be reviewed at any 
time if the agreed rent violates applicable legislation.  
3.1.1 Sweden  
Today the rents in Sweden are determined through a utility value system (bruksvärdessystem), which 
sets the reasonable rent for an apartment. Section 55 of the Swedish Tenancy Act
8
 states that the rent 
cannot be considered to be reasonable if it is substantially higher than the rent for units of equivalent 
utility value.  
If the parties have agreed on an excessive rent, the tenant shall start by informing the landlord of the 
new terms and conditions he or she wants to establish. If an agreement cannot be reached, the tenant is 
entitled to apply to the regional Rent Tribunal. When deciding the case, the Rent Tribunal will look at 
similar apartments with rents determined in collective bargaining agreements and there are many 
available objects as 90 % of Swedish tenants get their rents set in such collective bargaining 
agreements between the landlord
9
  and the Swedish Union of Tenants
10
. Normally the tenant union 
agrees either with the municipal landlords first and then that agreement sets the principles for the time 
period for the private landlords as well, or vice versa, and the agreement with private landlords and the 
organization representing the private landlords sets the principles for the municipal housing 
companies. If the parties do not agree, an application to the Rent Tribunal is usually made.  
It is reasonably easy for the tenant to challenge a rent that has been set too high. Even if the tenant 
cannot produce evidence of an apartment of equal value, with rent determined in a collective 
agreement, the Rent Tribunal will make an assessment of the rent such an apartment would have had, 
based on the Tribunal’s knowledge about local rents. It is almost impossible, however, to challenge the 
way that rents are set by the Swedish Tenants Union together with municipal or private landlords in 
collective bargaining agreements. If they agree, for instance, that location shall be very important in 
one city and of very little importance in another city, both solutions are deemed fair because they 
resulted from the collective bargaining process.  
In the 2011 reform there was intense discussion on whether new provisions should be introduced in 
the Tenancy Act, on how the price regulation should work. A Government White Book from 2008 
suggested the following legal criteria to be introduced in the Tenancy Act: the apartment’s size, 
standard, layout, location and other similar factors. It also suggested that the length of the waiting list 
or comparison with the prices on apartments in the ownership sector could be used as a tool for 
assessing the value of such factors objectively.
11
 However, when the Parliament adopted the new rules 
the suggested criteria was omitted and so were the references to market prices. At the time the 
landlords accepted this compromise, partly because the reform still included the obligation for the 
municipal housing companies to operate on business like principles and partly because a legal list of 
criteria and guidelines for its operation in preparatory works can be changed whenever there is a new 
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 government. A void to be filled out with court practice seemed to provide for a more stable and less 
political rent regulation. 
Therefore there are still no guidelines in Sweden for when a collective bargaining shall be set aside 
and  Svea Court of Appeal (the highest court in these type of cases) understand this as the law giving 
almost unlimited freedom for the parties to set the principles for the local tenancy market in the 
collective bargaining agreements and if for instance one party want location or any other factor to 
count for more the only viable course is to get the opposite party to agree.
12          
3.1.2 Denmark 
Four types of rent regulation exist in Denmark for private rental properties, of which market rent is the 
only one which actually relates to market forces and therefore to supply and demand. Market rates 
apply in the private sector for houses built from 1991 onward and for a few other types of tenancies, 
including newly built facilities.
13
The principal form of regulation is the cost-based rent, which was 
introduced in 1976 and which still regulates the rent in approximately 79 % of the private rented 
sector, as the system applies in almost all larger municipalities.
14
 It is determined on the basis of the 
running costs attributable to the property concerned. In addition, the owner can add a number of 
statutory provisions, a profit, and a surcharge for any improvements made to the rented property since 
the property was originally constructed. The rent is therefore an estimate and not a direct calculation of 
the actual cost held. The estimate is not based on actual price of the property when purchased – or any 
profit gained on it.  
This system therefore means that very large numbers of tenancies pay a rent below – or at least 
without the influence of – market rates. The system is effective; rents are controlled and it is easy for a 
tenant to challenge the initial rent if it is not set in accordance with the law. Moreover, when properties 
are located in regulated municipalities, it is not possible, at the commencement of the tenancy, to set 
the rent or terms and conditions for the rent which, based on an overall assessment, are more onerous 
for the tenant than the terms and conditions which apply to other tenants in the property.
15
  
Special rules apply to tenancies in small properties in regulated municipalities, i.e. to tenancies in 
properties which, as of 1 January 1995, comprised six or fewer residential apartments (not including 
single rooms).
16
 Correspondingly, for properties owned by co-operative housing associations, these 
rules will apply if there are six or fewer residential apartments in the property which are let by a co-
operative housing association, for as long as the property is owned by the co-operative.
17
 
In the so-called “unregulated municipalities” – no special rules apply regarding the amount of the rent 
at the time of the signing of the agreement, but following commencement of the agreement, the tenant 
may demand that the rent be reduced if it substantially exceeds the value of the premises. In these 
cases, the rent must be determined (on a discretionary basis) through a comparison with tenancies 
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 concerning properties in which there are seven or more tenancies and for which the rent has been 
regulated in accordance with the provisions concerning cost-based rent. The cost-based price control 
thus affects the rents for these properties as well. This is technically complicated and when stating that 
Denmark has four rent control systems, we can divide the “unregulated” municipalities into two 
subgroups. The four groups are thus cost-based rents, two forms of “unregulated” municipalities, and 
finally dwellings in houses built after 1991 and types of dwellings as specified in Section 53 (3-6) in 
the Danish Tenancy Act where market rents are allowed. 
The rent for properties in unregulated municipalities can be regulated during the period of tenancy in 
accordance with the rules for the value of the premises.
18
 It is also possible to agree on rent increases 
in accordance with the net retail price index.
19
 The increase may be implemented by the landlord's 
written notice thereof to the tenant – but only if, after the increase, the rent does not exceed a level in 
accordance with the legislation. 
The rent for properties situated in regulated municipalities can be increased in accordance with the 
rules regarding rent that does not exceed the amount required to cover the necessary operating costs 
for the property. The rent can also be raised when improvements have been made. The rent of most 
other tenancies can be raised when the value of the tenancy significantly exceeds the existing rent and 
similarly when improvements have been made.  
3.1.3 Finland – rent control abolished 
There is no direct rent control system in the private rental sector in Finland. If the rent exceeds the 
market rent, the court can at the tenant’s request reduce it. In principle, the ground for increasing rents 
must be agreed upon in the contract, precluding any blanket right for a private landlord to increase rent 
unilaterally.
20
 The most commonly used indexes are the cost-of-living index and the consumer-price 
index.
21
 In 2003, co-operation between the associations of landlords and tenants produced a common 
guideline called Fair Rental Practices. Along with the recommendations that negotiations must be 
initiated no later than six months prior to an intended increase and that the increase must be 
reasonable, the code of good practice says: “Increases may not exceed 15 per cent a year, except in 
situations where extensive renovations are being made to improve the property and the rental value of 
the apartment”.22 
3.2. Comparative remarks on rent regulation
23
 
None of the countries has rents that are totally free. Such rents would allow a landlord to evade all 
other aspects of tenancy protection and increase the rent to an unreasonable level. In Finland and for 
some dwellings in Denmark, the landlord is allowed to charge market rents, but the court can reduce 
them if they become significantly higher or stop termination of an open-ended contract if the landlord 
demands an excessive rent as a condition for letting the tenancy continue.  
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 Both Denmark and Finland have systems for automatic increases of the rent when agreed upon in the 
tenancy contract. In Finland, during the lease, the parties may also freely agree to a higher rent for 
only a few months, for instance to cover the costs of renovation.
24
 In Denmark – when the landlord has 
improved the premises – the landlord may demand a rent increase by an amount corresponding to the 
increase of the value of the premises. 
Sweden is different. The Swedish system is designed to induce landlords to become a part of the 
collective negotiation system. Within that system, collective bargaining agreements with the tenant 
union for long time periods (even open-ended ones) are possible, along with regular rent increases 
according to agreed conditions. Without this, the landlord must go to the Rent Tribunal and start a case 
each time a tenant disagrees with the requested (annual) increase.  
3.3 Preliminary discussion of the rent regulations in their context 
The overall conclusion when comparing the rent regulation/rent control system in the three countries is 
that at a fundamental level, the legislation started out in a very similar way and rent control was 
implemented during World War One in all three countries for the same reasons.  
The way rent control then has evolved has differed, however. One very important difference is the 
Swedish collective bargaining system, which has its origins in voluntary agreements between the 
Swedish Tenant Union and both municipal and private landlords after the Second World War; it lies at 
the core of Swedish rent regulation.  
EU or international regulation seems to have had no direct visible effect on the way rent control works 
in Finland and Denmark. In Denmark, only the private sector is subject to rent control. The rent a 
private Danish landlord can charge under the cost price-based rent regulation or any of the other three 
rent setting systems, is thus unaffected by the rents in the municipal housing companies. 
In Finland, landlords are either private and have free rents or are part of the social housing system 
which is open to municipal housing companies and private landlord with a public task. As the two 
systems are of almost equal size, the private landlords could feel that they are subject to unfair 
competition by not receiving state subsidies. In the parts of Finland were free rents are similar to price 
regulated rents, free rents are not an advantage that will compensate for the lack of subsidies.  In 
Helsinki where the difference between market rates and regulated rates is substantial – the risk is that 
private investment is crowded out if a significant share of land is allocated to social housing.
25
  
In Sweden, the system of collectively bargained rents within the utility-value rent control system 
applies both to municipal and private landlords. When this form of rent regulation replaced the old 
cost-based one, the rents charged by municipal landlords were to set the standard in the private sector 
as well (1975-2010). If a Swedish municipal housing company received a subsidy from the 
municipality and could therefore keep the rents low, private landlords needed to do the same.  This 
was seen as a possible breach of EU law, and in 2011 the system changed.
26
  
Any rent set in the collective bargaining process nowadays has the same value as a measurement of 
fair rents. The municipalities no longer have the right to subsidize their housing companies, for 
instance through helping them to borrow money on more favourable terms. In a system where a 
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 collective bargaining agreement between the tenants’ union and the municipal landlords clearly affects 
the rents of the private landlords – and vice versa – it was regarded as necessary to make sure that the 
companies competed on a level playing field. So far the visible effects of this change on the rent 
structure have been small.
27
  
Denmark and Sweden are similar in having a large municipal housing sector – in both countries it is 
larger than that of the private landlords.
28
 In Finland the social housing sector is almost as large as the 
private sector. In Denmark and Finland, a subsidy to the municipal housing company does not have 
any direct effect on the rents in the private rented sector, and in many places not even an indirect effect 
can be seen because there is no housing surplus and no direct competition between private landlords 
and social housing companies. If there is a housing shortage the private landlords will always have 
potential tenants. A municipal subsidy to construction of new apartments to the social housing sector 
will not affect the rent of a private Danish landlord because neither the cost-based rent regulation, nor 
any other rent regulation is based on the cost (or rents) in the municipal sector. In Finland market 
prices apply in the private sector. All that happens is that there is a price difference between tenants 
who rent in the municipal/social housing sector and in the private sector  
In Sweden, the rent charged by the municipal housing company will – if set in a collective bargaining 
agreement – become a norm for the private landlords through the rent regulation system. The Courts 
have (according to Svea Court of Appeal)
29
 no legal rule permitting a material review of the evaluation 
of different characteristics such as location. The evaluation agreed on between the municipal housing 
company and the tenant organisation will form the guiding principles for the private landlord as well.  
A municipal subsidy that allows a Swedish municipal housing company to lower their rents will thus 
normally make a Swedish private landlord legally bound to reduce their rents in the same way.   
Therefore, it is possible that all three countries have made accurate interpretations of EU law. In 
Sweden – unlike in Denmark and Finland – the rent regulation ties municipal and private landlords 
together to a commonly shared rent structure – whatever other market conditions apply. In Finland and 
Denmark competition problems arise only under certain market conditions (mainly where there is 
surplus supply of housing). 
 In many ways, the rules on rent regulation/rent control – especially in Denmark but also in Sweden – 
are difficult to understand and interpret, for both landlords and tenants. In Denmark it is not possible 
for lay people to properly calculate the maximum rent applicable to a particular tenancy, which means 
that in many cases the rent is unintentionally set too high. This is the cause of many legal disputes.  
In Sweden, it is reasonably easy for a layperson to show that the rent exceeds that of an apartment in 
the same municipality with the same utility value and with a collectively negotiated rent. But if the 
laypersons – or an expert – would demand a reason for the evaluation in the collective bargaining 
agreement, they would be denied an answer. The parties involved in the collective negotiation process 
have the right to agree on the value of an elevator, a central location, a nice garden and so on.  
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 In 2012, the average rent in Sweden was 5,960 SEK (640 EUR) per month for an apartment.
30
 The 
average disposable income per household was 275,200 SEK (29,560 EUR) a year in 2011, or 22,900 
SEK a month (2,460 EUR).
31
 That works out to a rent-to-income ratio of 25 %. 
In Denmark, the average rent per square metre in 2012 was approximately 1,000 DKK (134 EUR) in 
Copenhagen (and Aarhus). In general, approximately 29 % of Danish disposable income is used to pay 
rented housing expenses.
32
 This is a little higher than in Sweden.  
In Finland, the average rent per square metre of non-subsidized rental dwellings was 12.84 EUR per 
square metre for the whole country and 10.41 EUR the social housing sector.
33
 The average tenant 
uses 27 % of disposable income for rent.
34
 
Even though the technical construction of rent control is very complicated and different, the outcome 
and effects seem quite similar. All three countries have subsidies, but none of the three can afford to 
subsidize housing too heavily. Therefore – when looking at the larger picture – the rent control 
systems in Sweden and Denmark need to achieve rents similar to the free-market rents in Finland. In 
Finland the rent difference between rent regulated, subsidized housing and freely priced apartments is 
pronounced in Helsinki (4.82 EUR per square metre) but much smaller in the rest of the country (0.51 
EUR per square metre).
35
 
Another consequence of rent control is that in the largest cities, there is a surplus demand for private 
rented properties. In Sweden there is a general national shortage of housing, with more households 
than dwellings and very few empty apartments. 
In Central Copenhagen, the same types of problems are arising as the demand for cheaper rented 
dwellings is increasing. More people want to live in the capital and waiting lists for social housing 
dwellings are very long.  
Some of the advantages for the landlords on this matter – that they might not acknowledge – is that a 
steady high demand may prevent losses from vacant lettings and that they can pick and choose among 
tenants to get the most stable ones. The downsides from the landlord’s point of view are of course 
reduced profits. 
The same situation seems to be present with regard to subsidized housing in Helsinki.
36
 This indicates 
that “setting the rent free” is probably not a complete solution. There are also some other barriers for 
the functioning of the private rental sector market in Finland. In large parts of the country outside of 
Helsinki there are no large price differences between social and private housing. In these parts of the 
country the differences might not lead to problems, but in tighter markets – in the larger cities and 
especially in Helsinki – there are long waiting lists in social housing and in general insufficient supply 
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 of housing in the metropolitan region of Helsinki is a central concern, where a significant share of land 
is allocated to social housing, thus potentially crowding out private rental sector investments.
37
   
A favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing makes home-ownership attractive for most 
households in Finland.  And the relatively large social housing stock also provides barriers for the 
private rental sector, as many tenants with moderately high income are still eligible to get an apartment 
in the social housing sector – about 70 % of the population.  
The tenants that can afford market prices will get access to rented housing, but for the rest, waiting for 
an apartment with a housing company that applies social criteria like need (the major criteria in 
Finland) and waiting time will become a reality – or sharing space in apartments with other persons so 
as to be able to pay the market rent. All three countries rely on municipal housing companies or other 
subsidized housing to achieve affordable housing. The alternative would be for municipalities (or the 
state) to be ready to subsidize tenants to such a high degree that they can afford the market prices – but 
such a solution could become very expensive.
38
 
In Denmark, housing policy – especially taxes on the value of private property and rent control on the 
private rental market – is not on the political agenda. Tenants and their relatives are voters. Therefore 
the politicians in Parliament do not dare to suggest any changes to the systems.  Arguments that a 
more well-functioning private rental sector may have positive effects on the economy and labour 
mobility and reduce inefficiencies and risks of owner-occupied and social housing are somewhat 
ignored. 
This means that even though economists recommend setting rents free, this will not happen.
39
 The 
economists have failed to develop a more nuanced comprehension of the aim of rent control and the 
much-differentiated private rental sector. They also fail to take into consideration that public opinion 
(and not only among tenants) is that rent control is favourable. The Swedish Federation of Property 
Owners keeps the debate alive on liberalizing rent regulation in Sweden, but so far they have had 
limited success. 
The reasons why abolishment was possible in Finland in 1995 may be seen in the light of the political 
“climate” at the time – in Finland, it came after a recession in the late 1980s and with a desire for more 
activities in the construction industry. This aim has been at least partly achieved. The private rental 
sector has grown from 12 % at the time of the reform to 17 % of the housing stock today.
40
 Similar 
political agendas were current at the same time in Denmark, with the result that rents for all new, 
private rented dwellings that came in to use after 1991 could be set free. The overall and main 
conclusion to be drawn about the rent regulation regimes in Sweden, Denmark and Finland is that it is 
not possible to establish whether there is a “best practice” because the markets and political situations 
in the three countries for this specific area of tenancy law do not call for a common solution. 
 
4. Tenancy protection regarding the right to keep, use and transfer an apartment 
4.1 The basic protection against termination 
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 The right for a tenant to keep a dwelling that serves as a home is the most basic right. It is achieved 
through a requirement on the landlord to show just cause for terminating an open-ended contract and 
restrictions on the use of time-limited contracts.  
In Denmark, the tenant can stay as long as she or he can afford the rent. Termination of open-ended 
contracts requires just cause and the right to use time-limited contracts is regulated as well, 
irrespective of whether rent regulation applies. The court can set aside a time-limit clause if it is not 
warranted by the personal needs of the landlord.
41
  
 
In Sweden, time-limited contracts can be agreed upon – but the time limitation is irrelevant. According 
to Sections 3, 46 and 49 of the Tenancy Act, the landlord needs just cause to let the tenancy expire at 
the end of the agreed time period, precisely as just cause is needed for terminating an open-ended 
contract. Thus, tenancy rights in Denmark and Sweden – in principle – are perpetual.  
In Finland the landlord is free to use time-limited contracts to be certain of getting the apartment back 
at the end of the agreed period.
42
 This freedom means that Finnish tenants do not have as strong  
“ownership right” as Swedish or Danish tenants. 
 4.2 Landlord requirements on the dwelling for personal/family use 
In the private sector in Finland, freedom of contract applies, and just cause for terminating the tenancy 
is not needed – all that is needed is that the contract is terminated for a acceptable purpose (godtagbar 
orsak). In Finland a landlord may even terminate a time-limited contract ahead of the agreed time 
period for family reasons.
43
 
In Denmark, the landlord can terminate an open-ended contract if he or she needs the apartment, but 
cannot do so on behalf of an adult child starting a family (or any other relative for that matter). This 
rule applies to both private housing with rent regulation and private housing with market rates.  
In Sweden, the main rule in the Tenancy Act is that all personal reasons the landlord may invoke for 
ending a tenancy are perceived as only a weak justification. If the tenant has his or her home in the 
apartment, termination is not possible.
44
 Therefore, a large-scale rental company cannot normally evict 
a tenant to arrange housing for the landlord/owner or a landlord’s family member. However, if the 
landlord owns a few dwellings and they are bought mainly for family reasons, termination is 
permitted. In this situation – unlike in Denmark – helping children or parents to obtain a dwelling is 
allowed. 
4.3 The tenant’s right to transfer the tenancy to a family member 
The right to transfer property is a natural right for owners, but a right that seldom exists in rental 
agreements. In all three Nordic EU countries, if a tenant dies, the spouse can take over the tenancy. 
The same rule applies to co-habitants. In Sweden and in Finland there is no time requirement. In 
Denmark the cohabitation must have commenced at least two years before the death of the tenant.
45
 In 
Finland, an adult child, a parent of the deceased or the partner has the same right, if they live in the 
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 apartment at the time of the tenant’s death.46 In Sweden, any relative who has lived for three years 
with the tenant before the tenant’s death may assume rental possession of the apartment, if he or she is 
able to pay the rent and has not been a nuisance to the neighbours. 
In terms of tenant rights, the rules on death and the rules on divorce or separation are generally the 
same in all three countries.  With regard to divorces or separations, the courts may decide that the 
person not having the contract needs the apartment (for instance if that person is the prime carer of a 
common child), but apart from such situations the parties are free do agree on who gets the apartment 
within the limits above. These rights are mandatory in all three countries.  
The protection for tenants is thus extensive in all three countries, with Finland and Sweden giving 
marginally better protection than Denmark. However, in Finland the landlords can freely use time-
limited contracts and the relative will then take over a tenancy that the landlord can terminate at the 
end of the agreed time – just as for the original tenant. 
4.4 The right to sublet part of the apartment 
A right to let out the entire property or sublet a part of it is also a natural part of ownership. There is no 
rule allowing an owner to rent out his or her house. It is allowed unless a legal rule prohibits it. The 
opposite principle applies to rented property.  
In Denmark and Finland the tenant has a right to sublet half of the dwelling’s rooms to unrelated 
persons.
47
 This right is absolute. The tenant need not show that the subletting is necessary to be able to 
afford the apartment, or any other valid reason. In Finland, a private landlord can freely use time-
limited contracts and get the apartment back at the end of the agreed time period, thus limiting the 
general effect of all aspects of tenancy protection.  
In Sweden there is no maximum number of rooms that can be sublet, as long as the apartment is large 
enough for the number of persons living in it.
48
  
4.5 The tenant’s right to sublet the whole apartment 
As a general rule, it is not allowed to sublet the whole apartment in any of the three countries, but all 
of them have situations where it is permitted. In Denmark it is permitted to sublet most dwellings for a 
period not exceeding two years, for reasons such as illness, business, placement, studies etc. The 
Finnish rule is almost identical.
49
  
In Sweden, more situations are expressly mentioned in Section 40 of the Swedish Tenancy Act, for 
instance starting a relationship. The tenant usually gets permission for one year (six months if trying 
out living together with a new partner).
50
 New permissions may be given especially for “better” 
reasons such as work or studies.
51
 If, in the case of illness, the tenant has a reasonable chance to 
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 become healthy enough to return to the dwelling, the right to sublet can be renewed with no upper 
limit.
52
  
Sweden seems slightly more generous towards the tenant compared to Finland and Denmark, with 
regards both to the situations where subletting is allowed and its accompanying time limits. 
4.6 Choosing wallpapers and similar interior features 
Finally, there is also the tenant’s right to alter a rented apartment to his or her liking. The owner of a 
house may paint it in another colour, but a person renting a dwelling does not have this right. In 
Sweden, the tenant has a right according to Section 24a of the Swedish Tenancy Act to paint, change 
the wallpaper, the flooring etc., even if the landlord keeps the apartment in good repair. As long as the 
tenant stays in the apartment, the landlord has no say in the matter. When the tenant moves out, the 
landlord is entitled to damages, but only if he or she has suffered a loss. Changing new neutral 
wallpaper to one with a very special pattern may make the apartment more difficult to rent out again, 
and the landlord may then be entitled to reimbursement from the tenant for the cost of changing the 
wallpaper.
53
 However, if the old wallpaper was so old that the landlord needed to change it anyway, 
the new wallpaper has not led to any additional cost for the landlord – and there will be no damages.54 
This Swedish right is really a core ownership-user right. Nobody would dream of changing the colour 
of a rented car or anything else they rented. 
4.6 Protection against new owner of the property 
If a person rents a car for a year and that car is sold before the rent contract expires, the buyer 
will be able to get possession of the car. The renter loses possession of the car because the 
buyer has a better right to use it. The Latin term to describe this principle is emptio tollit 
locatum (a purchase breaks a rent contract). It applies as the legal rule setting the starting 
point of renting of normal property (as opposed to real property), because renting of normal 
property is usually a right in person – a right valid only against the counterpart of the contract. 
With regard to real property, the normal legal solution is that tenants keep their rights with 
respect to the new owner of the property; the renter thus has the better right to use the 
premises than the new owner. The Latin term for this is that it is a right in rem – a right valid 
against everybody. All three Nordic EU Members have this solution in their tenancy 
legislation.
55
  
 
5 Ownership versus contract approach 
Several individual aspects of the tenancy legislation point towards taking the view that the tenant has a 
right of ownership to a home with a degree of real property characteristics. These aspects relate both to 
the termination of the contract and the use of the apartment. 
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 However, this might not be the right perspective. In all three Nordic EU Member countries, tenancy 
law is formally framed as contract law with special protection for the tenant, in the same way that 
consumers or employees also receive protection in special legislation from a contract-law point of 
origin. 
In all three countries, contract law applies to conclusion and interpretation of tenancy contracts.
56
 
There are no special requirements for conclusion; offers (and acceptance) will be binding without 
further requirements when negotiating, and oral contracts are also binding. This is in contrast to the 
rules regarding real property, where formal requirements like written contracts (and in some other 
countries even registration) sometimes are a necessary condition for the validity of contractual terms. 
Looking at what happens when the tenant enters into a contract; the contract-law approach seems well 
founded. 
The question then arises whether or not it makes a difference if a contract-law or an ownership/real-
property law approach to renting of homes is taken. 
 
6. Final remarks: rent regulation revisited from a real-property or an ownership 
perspective 
Looking at rent regulation in Denmark and Sweden makes it clear that the concept is popular among 
tenants. Tenancies are a large part of the housing sector and this is a group that politicians cannot 
afford to ignore. However, it is also obvious that there are no concrete ideas about what a just rent is or 
how it should be calculated. A layperson cannot easily understand how rent is calculated in the Danish 
cost-based system (or in other Danish rent control systems for that matter). The average tenant, 
however, trusts the system to come up with a reasonably fair and predictable rent – compared to the 
ups and downs of market pricing – and therefore supports the system. The same applies in Sweden. 
The utility values are set in the collective bargaining system and the rents resulting from this process 
are seen as fair because of the trust the tenants put in the system relative to the trust they put in market 
pricing.  
With regard to both subsidies and rent control, renting a home is very different from owning one. This 
difference is pronounced if renting a dwelling is perceived as a rent contract, rooted in contract-law 
principles as opposed to home ownership. Rent contracts then become quite like ordinary contracts, as 
in Finland (if the landlord use the freedom to impose time-limited contracts), where special legislation 
applies only as long as the contract is in force and contracts can be terminated at the end of the agreed 
time period. The tenancy legislation may also give the tenant a right to stay in the apartment 
perpetually. If this path is taken by the legislator rents cannot be completely free, because an 
unreasonable rent hike can be a way of forcing the tenant to leave the apartment. Market rents are 
possible but the landlord cannot be allowed to go beyond that point.  
If the fairness of a rent control system is to be judged in relation to other contracts, there really is 
nothing with which it can be compared. As in the labour market, one has to state that it is a contract 
sui generis (of its own kind). 
If, one on the other hand, one takes the view that the tenant has some kind of “ownership” of his or her 
home and that renting a dwelling creates a right with real-property characteristics, there is a group to 
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 compare with: the true owners. In the ownership market, the buyer faces market forces when buying a 
home, because the prices and the interest paid on the loan are set by market forces. When living in a 
home the buyer is shielded from increasing prices for homes. Even if the market price doubles, the 
loan and the interest stay the same. The owner can become unable to afford the home, if the source of 
income is lost or if the interest on the loan increases too much. If property taxation increases (it may 
be linked to market prices, for instance) or energy prices go up, a home can become unaffordable too.  
A price regulation can be constructed in a way that strives to give the tenant the same protection as 
home owners against market forces. Such a regulation would have free rents when a contract is first 
signed, just like the free pricing in the ownership market. Yearly rent increases could then be set 
according to an index. Such a calculation should try to target true cost changes, such as the energy 
cost, taxation, inflation on materials and wages, changes of the real interest rate and so on. The tenant 
would thus be protected if the market gradually doubled the value of a central location, but not if the 
politicians create taxes that mirror this increase – just like an owner faces cost increases in the latter 
case but not in the former case. 
The same thing could be said about subsidies. The different forms of subsidies that a state applies 
should be constructed so that they apply equally to rented and owned housing – for instance a set 
amount for each newly produced dwelling. Special forms that are available only to owners, such as the 
possibility to deduct interest on a mortgage from income tax, should be avoided. 
Maybe it is not possible – or at least very difficult – to create such a rent regulation and subsidy 
system. Maybe the reader disagrees that the treatment of house owners with regard to taxes, subsidies 
and market prices is a natural starting point for evaluating the fairness of taxes, subsidies and rent 
control for tenants. 
However, the question of whether or not renting a home is considered as a right related to ownership 
with real property characteristics – or whether one perceives this as a right mostly connected to 
contract law – is clearly relevant when forming ideas of a just regulatory balance between landlords 
and tenants. The more one considers tenancy as a real property and an ownership-user right, the more 
natural a comparison with the true ownership market becomes.    
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